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Debris impact analysis and mapping results for the 
rocket vehicle ALV
aBstract
A risk analysis of the ATK ALV X1 vehicle was 
developed by the American company ACTA to 
support the NASA space agency Wallops Flight 
Facility located in Virginia. This particular risk 
analysis obtained results of the probability of im-
pact of fragments of this vehicle that could collide 
with a B747 aircraft that could be flying over the 
space test area. The ATK ALV X1 was launched 
successfully but left its nominal flight path tra-
jectory after 27 seconds, and for safety purposes, 
the flight termination system (FTS) was activated 
by destroying the vehicle and throwing into space 
the fragments that endanger air transport. Once 
again, in space history, ACTA contributes to pu-
blic and transportation safety in this manner.
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resumen
Un análisis de riesgo del vehículo espacial ATK 
ALV X1 fue desarrollado por la compañía 
norteamericana ACTA para dar soporte a la agencia 
espacial NASA Wallops Flight Facility, localizado 
en Virginia. Este análisis de riesgo en particular, 
obtuvo resultados de probabilidades de impacto 
de fragmentos o escombros de dicho vehículo que 
podría impactar sobre aviones B747 que podrían 
estar sobrevolando el área de prueba espacial. El 
ATK ALV X1 despegó con éxito, pero salió de 
su trayectoria de vuelo después de 27 segundos, 
y por seguridad, el sistema de terminación de 
vuelo (FTS) fue activado destruyendo al vehículo 
y lanzando al espacio los fragmentos que ponen 
en peligro al transporte aéreo. Una vez más, en la 
historia espacial, ACTA contribuye a la seguridad 
del público y transporte en este sentido.
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Introduction
ACTA was asked to provide additional 
support to ATK (Alliant Techsystems) and 
NASA-WFF (Wallops Flight Facility) in 
preparation for the forthcoming launch 
of the ALV X1 vehicle. The two areas of 
support were: (1) updating the toxic risk 
database due to a change in the trajectory 
and (2) provide an analysis of the risks to 
the aircraft from debris resulting from a 
vehicle breakup.
The purpose of the ATK ALV X1 
vehicle was to carry two payloads. The 
HY-BOLT (Hypersonic Boundary Layer 
Transition) and SOAREX (Suborbital 
Aerodynamic Reentry Experiment). The 
first was designed to cross the atmosphere 
and evaluate the boundary layer as 
described by Schetz, J. and Bowersox, 
R. (2011). The second to characterize a 
new vehicle for re-entry and innovative 
self-orientation as described by Eterno, 
J. (1989). The vehicle was designed to 
reach a height of 400 km and a speed 
of approximately 8,500 km / h (Mach 
number of 8). At this point, the payloads 
should have been ejected.
For this mission, NASA and ATK hired 
ACTA to conduct a risk analysis of debris 
impact on airplanes in order to prevent 
areas of risk and to take the necessary 
measures to protect air transport. 
However, on August 28, 2008, ATK 
ALV X1 was launched successfully but 
the ascent lasted only about 27 seconds, 
and immediately the vehicle began to 
turn off course, which is why the flight 
termination system (FTS) was activated 
to finish the mission. The results of the 
risk analysis that ACTA carried out prior 
to the launch, served to support, and 
in that sense, prevent disasters due to 
debris impacts on aircraft flying over the 
spacecraft’s flight area.
Discussion
Two fragment lists were used for the 
risk analysis using a program named 
RRAT. The first list contained Stage 2 
debris assuming and explosive failure 
im the Star 37 Stage 2 solid rocket 
motor as described by Eterno, J. (1989). 
This debris list started at the Stage II 
ignition time of 73 seconds and adjusted 
at 10 seconds intervals of flight. The 
second debris list contained a complete 
fragment list for Stage 1 flight. In this 
list, the number of fragments in the 
Stage 2avionics section due to a Stage 1 
explosion was not reduced as it was for 
Stage 2 failures. ATK pointed out that 
they have a rather massive aluminum 
plate above the Stage 2 attitude control 
system (ACS), defined by Larson, and 
Wertz, (1992) that shields the avionics 
pallet and avionics section from direct 
impact from fragments ejected from a 
failure/explosion in the lower part of the 
vehicle.
No malfunction turns were used 
in the analysis because of the limited 
time to perform the work. Cross-range 
dispersions due to guidance uncertainties 
were provided to ACTA in form of a 
plot that had results from a Monte Carlo 
analysis (2000 trajectories) of guidance 
and performance variation (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. IIP Plots of the Outcome of Many 
Random Trajectories from the Uncertainty 
in Guidance and Performance.
Figure 2 shows the impact probability 
contours for a B747 aircraft flying along a 
contour. The primary source for the cross-
range extent of the contours is the fragment 
velocities as described by Nelson, Larson, 
and Arriola, (2007). No malfunction 
turns were used in the analysis because 
of the limited time and the cross-range 
dispersions due to guidance uncertainties 
were not included either.
The impact probability contours 
extend downrange approximately 887 
NM from the launch pad to the 1x10 -7 
contour level.
                                            
Figure 2. Aircraft (B747) Debris Impact 
Probability Contours Using No Cross-Range 
Guidance and Performance Uncertainty or 
Malfunction Turn Contribution
The impact probability contours 
during second stage would normally 
drop off, but this vehicle has a very slow 
IIP (instantaneous impact point) rate 
during second stage which produces 
longer dwell times. Consequently, the 
higher probability contours persist until 
the end of flight.
To see if the addition of cross-range 
uncertainty would change the results, 
two more plots were prepared: one with 
a 5 nm one-sigma cross-range variation 
at burnout and the second with a 10 nm 
cross-range variation. These two numbers 
were based on the likely dispersions 
estimated from the Monte Carlo results 
in Figure 1. ACTA developed a metric 
body axis data file (MBOD) for input to 
RRAT as described by Nelson, Larson, 
and Arriola, (2007) to capture the 
cross-range uncertainty in the form of 
covariance matrices due to guidance and 
performance error. Figure 3 and Figure 
4 show how 5 nm and 10 nm (1σ) 
cross range guidance and performance 
uncertainties affect the impact probability 
contours.
                                             
Figure 3. Aircraft (B747) Debris Impact 
Probability Contours Using 5 nm (1σ) 
Cross-Range Guidance and Performance 
Uncertainty
Debris impact analysis and mapping results for the rocket vehicle ALV
| Campus | V. XXIII | No. 25 | enero-junio  | 2018 |  
42
Figure 4. Aircraft (B747) Debris Impact 
Probability Contours Using 10 nm (1σ) 
Cross-Range Guidance and Performance 
Uncertainty 
Comparing Figure 2, Figure 3 and 
Figure 4, we find very little difference in 
the dispersions. Thus, we conclude that 
the dispersion due to fragment velocity 
dominates. In addition, all three figures 
have high probability contours all the 
way to the end of flight. Consequently, 
it can be concluded that with this debris 
list, these high failure probabilities and a 
low accelerating 2nd stage, the contours 
will persist to the impact region.
Conclusion
Two critiques of the approach 
depicted in the charts above have 
been made, suggesting these results 
are over-conservative. The results are 
approximated by assuming aircraft are 
flying “along a contour” (or equivalently 
around a grid cell at that point) for the 
entire duration that debris is a hazard 
at that altitude. A first critique is that 
aircraft quickly pass through the region, 
so are not exposed to the entire duration 
of debris. While it is true that most 
aircraft passing through a given location 
will be exposed to lower risk, a previous 
study has demonstrated that these results 
are only slightly conservative compared 
to an aircraft with the worst-case flight 
path (time and direction) through the 
point. However, there is currently non 
procedure to prohibit only specific flight 
paths (with the resolution necessary 
to discriminate this), so it is necessary 
to prohibit all flights through points 
exceeding the criterion. Secondly, the 
method assumes that an aircraft is present, 
when in fact, there are few flights, and 
therefore one should consider the density 
of aircraft. This could be correct when the 
consideration is collective risk. However, 
the aircraft keep-out region is defined in 
order that individual risk is below the 
acceptable risk criterion.
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